The rst scheme
The public information in Shamir's rst scheme consists of a large integer N of unknown factorization (even the legitimate users need not know its factorization), and the coe cients of k ? 1 quadratic forms f 2 ; ; f k in k variables x 1 ; ; x k each. Each of these quadratic forms can be written as f i = X j;` ij`xj x` (1) where i ranges from 2 to k and the matrix ij`i s symmetric i.e. ij`= i`j . The secret information is a pair of linear transformations. One linear transformation B relates the quadratic forms f 2 ; ; f k to another sequence of quadratic forms g 2 ; ; g k . The second linear transformation A is a change of coordinates that relates the variables (x 1 ; ; x k ) to a set of \original" variables (y 1 ; ; y k ). Denoting by Y the column vector of the original variables and by X the column vector of the new variables, we can simply write Y = AX.
Of course, the coe cients of A and B are known only to the legitimate user. The trap-door requirements are twofold: when expressed in terms of the original variables y 1 ; ; y k , the quadratic forms g 2 is computed as: g 2 = y 1 y 2 (2) and the subsequent g i 's, 3 i k are sequentially linearized, i.e. can be written g i (y 1 ; ; y k ) = l i (y 1 ; ; y i?1 ) y i + q i (y 1 ; ; y i?1 )
where l i is a linear function of its inputs and q i a quadratic form.
To sign a message M; one hashes M to a k ? 1-tuple (f 2 ; ; f k ) of integers modulo N, then nds a sequence (x 1 ; ; x k ) of integers modulo N satisfying (1) . This is easy from the trap-door.
We let A i , 2 i k denote the k k symmetric matrix of the quadratic form f i , namely:
A i = ( ij`)1 j k;1 ` k (4) The kernel K i of g i is the kernel of the linear mapping whose matrix is A i . It consists of vectors which are orthogonal to all vectors with respect to g i . The rank of the quadratic form g i is the rank of A i . It is the dimension of K i as well as the unique integer r such that g i can be written as a sum of squares of r independent linear functionals. Actually, all this is not completely accurate as N is not a prime number and therefore Z=N is not a eld. This question is addressed at the end the paper and, meanwhile, we ignore the problem.
An easy computation shows that K i is the subspace de ned in terms of the original variables by the equations y 1 = = y i = 0 (5) >From this, it follows that i) K i is decreasing ii) the dimension of K i is k ? i iii) any element of K i?1 not in K i is an isotropic element wrt g i , which means that the value of g i is zero at this element.
We will construct a basis b i of the k-dimensional space, such that b i+1 ; ; b k spans K i for i = 2; ; k ? 1. The main problem we face is the fact that the g i 's and therefore the K i 's are unknown. In place, we know the f i 's. We concentrate on the (unknown) coe cient i of g k in the expression of f i , i.e. we write
As coe cients have been chosen randomly,we may assume that k is not zero. Let 
2 The second scheme
We now treat Shamir's 3] second scheme. The ideas developed in this section will have general applicability. Throughout, we will pretend we are working in Z=p rather than Z=N. We treat rst the case s = 1: We begin with k variables y 1 ; y 2 ; : : :; y k ; with k odd. These are subjected to a secret linear change of variables which gives 
This is an algebraic relation among i?2 ; i?1 ; i ; i+1 ; and i+2 :
We formulate the relation as the vanishing of several determinants, and reduce the resulting ideal by factoring out any occurrences of ( i ? j ); i 6 = j to assure that i ; j are really two di erent solutions. That is, we consider the ideal formed by F( i ), (F( i ) ? F( j ))=( i ? j ), etc., and the various determinants.
We apply the Groebner basis and the Euclidean algorithm to this ideal to nd a basis. Only multiples of some u i satisfy such a relation (19) over Z=p, namely, two di erent linear relations. We x a multiple of each u i by normalizing u i to have rst coordinate 1. The linear relations serve to de ne u i in terms of i .
By similar argument, there is a quadratic equation expressing i+1 in terms of i ; whose two solutions are i+1 generates a pair of`adjacent' elements (u i ; u i+1 ) (elements which are multiplied together in the original signature). We think of as generating an extension of degree k over Z=N, and as generating an extension of degree 2 over Z=N ]=F( ). The ability to distinguish the unordered pairs of`adjacent' roots f i ; i+1 g makes the system similar, in spirit, to a Galois extension of Q whose Galois group is the dihedral group on k elements. We will call on this analogy later. (Remark: it is only an analogy, because and really are elements of the ground elds.)
We can get the missing kth equation
The coe cients of v 0 k in terms of y j y`ostensibly depend on i and on the pairings ( i ; i+1 ); or equivalently on ( ; ). But the coe cients would come out the same no matter which solution ( ; ) were chosen, that is, no matter whether we assigned the ordering (1; 2; 3; : ::; k) or (3; 2; 1; k; k?1;: ::; 4) to the solutions u i . This means that the coe cients will be in fact independent of ( ; ). They will be expressible in terms of only the coe cients of the original v i ; 1 i k. This is because they are symmetric (up to dihedral symmetry) in the solutions i .
The 
For each of 2k di erent choices of ( ; ) the value of c comes out the same. Treating (22) as 2k linear equations in the 2k unknowns w ij , with coe cients given by i j for various choices of ( ; ), we must nd (if the matrix has full rank) that w 00 = c, and w ij = 0 for (i; j) 6 = (0; 0): Now we wish to solve a particular signature. We are given the values v 1 ; : : :; v k?1 , and we assign an arbitrary value to v 0 k . We have the equations relating v i to u j u j+1 :
where b 0 ij depends on j . Select (symbolically) one pair ( ; ) to x the rst two solutions (u 1 ; u 2 ), and compute the others in terms of ( ; ): Then we have b 0 ij u j u j+1 depending only on ( ; ). Invert this matrix b 0 to solve for u j u j+1 in terms of the given v i and ( ; ): Now assign u 1 = ;
where is an unknown. Compute 
We do not solve for (we cannot). So now we have three algebraic unknowns: ; ; ; of successive degrees k; 2; 2. These equations give u i in terms of ; ; . Notice that each u i is an odd function of : either times a function of ( ; ) or ?1 times a function of ( ; ). We also have u i as linear combinations of y j with coe cients depending on ( ; ). Solve for y j in terms of ( ; ; ), and note that y j is again an odd function of . Now each product y j y`will be a function only on ( ; ), since it will be an even function of , and we know 2 in terms of ( ; ). But again the value y j y`will be independent of the dihedral ordering (1; 2; 3; : ::; k) versus (3; 2; 1; k; k?1;: ::; 4), and thus independent of the choice of solutions ( ; ). That means, by standard Galois theory arguments, that ( ; ) will not appear in the expressions of y j y`.
So we have found the products y j y`in terms of the given coe cients, the given values v 1 ; v 2 ; : : :; v k?1 , and the assumed value v 0 k . We have given a valid signature.
3 Comments and extensions 3.1 Working mod N versus working mod p Some justi cation is needed to go from calculations modp to calculations mod N. In section 1, we basically use tools from linear algebra such as Gaussian elimination or determinants. Thus all computations go through regardless the fact that N is composite. The situation is a bit more subtle in section 2. For instance, F has k solutions modp but k 2 solutions modN, each obtained by mixing some solution modp with some solution modq. But if we consider only the image, modp, of our calculations modN, things are all right: the symmetric functions of the k roots of a polynomial are expressible in terms of the coe cients of the polynomial, and the expressions of the products y j y`in terms of the coe cients of the public key are valid modp. They are also valid modq, and the Chinese remainder theorem su ces to make them valid modN. This in spite of the fact that a solution of F mod N might well mix di erent solutions i mod p and j mod q: Since we never explicitly solve for , but only work with it symbolically and use the fact that F( ) = 0 mod N, we never are in danger of factoring N.
Extension to the case s > 1 (Sketch)
The case s > 1 is more complicated. Suppose again that we have k variables y 1 ; y 2 ; : : :; y k , with k odd, whose pairwise products constitute the signature, and that the hashed message has k ? s quantities v 1 ; v 2 ; : : :; v k?s , together with coe cients c ij`e xpressing v i in terms of y j y`. Suppose for simplicity that s > 1 is odd, so that k ? s is even.
Some linear combinations of the k?s quadratic forms v i will have rank s+1. Namely, for each index set I f1; 2; : : :; kg of size (s + 1)=2 such that 8i; j 2 I: j i ? j j 2, there is such a linear combination of the form
The number of such index sets I is k 3.3 The case k=3, s=1
In the special case k = 3, s = 1, where we must satisfy two quadratic equations in three variables, we can employ an ad hoc method, since the methods outlined above don't work. Take a linear transformation of the two quadratic equations so that the right-hand side of one equation vanishes; that is, if the given values are v 1 and v 2 , take v 2 times the rst equation minus v 1 times the second. This gives a homogeneous quadratic equation in three variables y 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 :
